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WILL AND LIBERTY IN HUME AND BERKELEY 




Abstract: This paper aims to compare Hume and Berkeley’s approach on will and 
liberty. Berkeley defines will as a mind’s faculty, whereas Hume understands it attached 
to impressions. Both philosophers claim for definition as a philosophical method to 
enhance the knowledge of nature. The conclusion discusses determinism as attached to 
liberty. Since his religious commitment, Berkeley tried to turn compatible determinism 
and liberty. Despite the current arguments that called Hume a stringent determinist due 
to his aim of a Science of human nature, we state that this thesis should be revised. In 
other words, we can’t assure definitely Hume as a determinist (Penelhum, 1993, 243), 
seeing that his argument covers the possibility of liberty.  
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VONTADE E LIBERDADE EM HUME E BERKELEY 
Resumo: O objetivo desse artigo é comparar os principais argumentos sobre a vontade 
e a libertade em Hume e Berkeley. Se a vontade se constitui, em Berkeley, como uma 
faculdade; em Hume ela é associada às impressões. Um ponto metodologico comum em 
ambos filosofos é que eles compartilham da exigência de definição dos termos para bem 
embasar os argumentos. A conclusão deste artigo discute a noção de determinismo, que 
é concomitante à liberdade. Berkeley, à partir de seus compromissos religiosos, teria se 
esforçado em compatibilizar estas noções a principio antagônicas. No entanto, Hume é 
tido pela bibliografia como um determinista, bibliografia que parece não considerar seu 
argumento da possibilidade da liberdade. Em outros termos, no que se configura nossa 
segunda conclusão, Hume não pode ser dito um determinista radical (Penelhum: 1993, 
243), muito embora seu projeto de constituir uma ciência da natureza humana. Uma 
versão da tese compatibilista parece ter concordado com essa revindicação.       
 
Palavras-chave: ética, vontade, Liberdade 
 
   It’s not without relevance that Hume's treatise advances the subject of liberty 
together to his reflections on Will (II.3.1.2. and 3)
181
. The first section of the chapter on 
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 It seems that in the Treatise Hume approached the subject in a more metaphysical way than in the 
Inquiry. At the section VIII of the An Inquiry Concerning The Human Understanding, we can find a 
trying to turn compatible moral and determinism (this term was not yet used by Hume, signifying that all 
actions of body and mind, as natural events, has a similar causal determination). The great challenge of 
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this subject claim for the relationship between Will and direct passions. Hume presents 
us the definition of Will, namely, a consciousness’ impression impelling body by 
motion or mind by perception. Remarkably, his argument displaces the possibility to 
define Will, despite giving a definition on it before. Such strategy seems close to a 
skeptical one, in order to avoid any philosophical debate concerning its definition.  
   Concerning liberty, one thing we must consider in first instance is that, since 
matter defines the body and the bodies are defined by matter, there is no liberty on this 
sphere. Necessity is the only direction that bodies obey. The issue is related also to 
mind, or, if its movements depend anyhow on matter and hence obeys necessity. Hume, 
however, was not willing to claim for any sway between mind and body.   
   We can’t discover any substantial connection between objects (there is no 
knowledge of their essence). We can’t say that necessity achieves the essence of 
objects, what eliminates the label of an extreme determinism usually said of him. In 
other words, if essence is unknown, there is no way how attribute principles to it. 
However, external objects are recognized by the observation of connections. Even that 
does not allow us to assert an essential connection between them, since it is our mind 
that makes it. Necessity is a matter of connection (union) and inference.   
   In searching for the true motivations of our actions, Hume present us his own 
thesis, by claiming a lasting connection between our actions and motivations (which 
includes our tempers and contexts where actions were made). Hume is clearly searching 
for patterns and regularities in human nature (‘the necessary and uniform principles of 
human nature’) making parallels with nature itself. Diversity is a constant effect that can 
be observed from descriptions of nature and men. We have a principle which links 
necessity to the uniformity of actions. Notwithstanding, we may question if there is 
really a necessity in human actions, since human beings are motivated by feelings, 
desires, and passions. My point here is that, giving the plurality of motivator factors, 
any theory which claims for patterns in human actions may be a reductionist one.    
                                                                                                                                                                          
this section is the relationship between determinism and liberty. Will determines the choice of act or not 
act and this is liberty.   
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   Actions of men must be judged by observing some principles or maxims. 
Regularity has distinct levels. Such degrees of regularity, related to probability and 
evidence, makes possible an adjustment between mind and human actions. These levels 
could make possible a type of harmony related to regularities and contradictions. This is 
complex on Hume's argumentation and deserves more attention that I could pay in the 
present article. What must be kept in mind, in this context, is that even in cases when 
we have weak connections and the irregularities of actions of mind and body are not 
well perceived, they still produce a certain type of regularity.   
   Finally, we can say that irregularities are more concerned to the limits of our 
reason (‘confused ideas and undefined terms’) then the reality of facts, on which we 
could still assert: despite the mind’s borders, natural reality always presents us with a 
kind of regularity.  
   Necessity came so from this link between actions and motivations. It assures to 
the mind regularities inferred from the outside world. There is no place to liberty in this 
relationship. The parity between regular patterns observed from the relationship of 
actions, motivations, and mind's inferences assures the certainty of necessity.  
   The argument runs to the definition of 'moral evidence', that is, judgments and 
conclusions upon the relations between “[…] actions, motives, temper and situations”
 
(HUME, 1854, p.154). The examples used by Hume are soft. They are important since 
they provide a full sphere of actions classified as what we know as human science 
(history, politics, economy and even ordinary actions, like an order gave by a nobleman 
to his servant). All these prove the existence of necessity in human actions thought we 
must always pay attention to the gap between mind and nature asserted by Hume as a 
principle of his philosophy.  
   Including an explanation of physical necessity that I’ll not consider here, since 
my issue is the connections between liberty and Will, we can depict Hume's 
commitment to definitions. His intellectual approach to the problem of liberty comes 
from the fact that definitions are the whole base of thought. Hence, if necessity assures 
the idea of causation, liberty assures the idea of chance that could be always refuted by 
the principle that experience always gives us regularities. If what exists (and could be 
known) is related to experience, there is no place for liberty and free-Will. The theory of 
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liberty is absurd because it goes against experience itself and is unintelligible since there 
is no definition of liberty.  
The second section is intended to analyze the arguments in favor of the existence 
of liberty and free Will. First, individuals in their perception of their own actions, 
despite been conscious of their motives, could not completely admit after the execution 
of an action that they were motivated by necessity. This impossibility is also due to 
some breakthrough traits of necessity (force, violence and constraint), that blocks the 
recognition of necessity in the actions executed by human beings. I point out that the 
lack of a clear and constant consciousness of oneself during the execution of an act, 
leads men to consider that past actions were free. I propose to call this argument as 'the 
self-perception against liberty'. In this case, Hume was turned to his own theory of self 
and personal identity. In what extent, than, the claim that a third person (the spectator) 
could infer the motivations of our actions better than ourselves could be attached to 
Hume’s theory of self ? I mean, since the bundle of sensations is the only thing a person 
would know of himself, we could ask what type of knowledge it means. If not, a third 
point of view could be more able to concede a more convincing knowledge of 
ourselves, which seems to be paradoxical.    
   From this false inference of past actions derives a divergence between liberty 
of spontaneity and indifference. Second, then, Hume develops the argument of the 
falsity of the experience and sensation of liberty. Liberty is a confused connection 
between ideas. This bemused state of mind comes when consciousness loses the real 
connections between ideas which are, as we have seen, the reflection of natural 
connections of the external world. This topic deserves to be further explored. Men are 
always prone to think that Will does not has any motive which determines it. Despite 
the fact they can perceive that actions are motivated by Will, they cannot imagine what 
determines it. The explanation of this epistemic limit comes from the explanation of the 
illusion of the powers of Will. We even tend to think that Will, even when it is refused, 
is somehow presented in our thoughts, motivating our actions.   
Third, men falsely believe in liberty also in a religious context. Any theory of 
necessity that refuses liberty is not necessarily false. Despite the use of this sort of 
arguments during centuries, this religious topic must not be regarded as one that 
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conducts us to truth. Hume is bent to prove that the theory of necessity is healthful for 
religion, giving us therefore a second series of definitions about necessity.                               
   Hume states that his theory of Will is close to philosophical tradition because it 
doesn't deny some liberty to it, due to fact that inferences made by mind are only copies 
of the true connections between the observed objects in nature: "[...] but sure I am, I 
ascribe nothing to the actions of mind, but what must readily be allowed of. […]" 
(HUME, 1854, p.160). Will, hence, is not attached necessarily to the laws of cause and 
effect. That must be underlined as the main point of this paper.    
The principle of causality
182
 and the observation of necessity are also included in 
his argument for religious reasons, such as those as ‘punishment and reward’. The 
religious arguments about how human actions are related to God are based on this 
principle. This leads to reflections upon justice and agent responsibility. The theory of 
liberty and chance, as exposed in this second section of the Third Part of the Second 
Book, would have amoral consequences, since it could exempt a man from the 
responsibility of a given act. This, we can claim, is a strong argument to reject the 
theories of liberty
183
. Hereupon, accordingly to Hume, all actions caused by Will are, in 
a certain way, needed. But, by this conclusion a tenet is achieved. I mean, it does not 
seem logically acceptable that we can infer the non-existence of liberty by the 
possibility to punish someone.    
   Concerning Will and its motivations, Hume opposes reason and passions. 
Reason would never have a strict influence on passions, but it would also be inefficient 
in separating passions from it. Reason is associated with demonstration (abstract 
relations of our ideas). The hypothesis is that the efforts of reason are never enough to 
determine Will, since the realm of reason is related to ideas. In fact, Hume is explicit in 
claiming that Will is concerned to reality and, henceforth, to actions: "[...] and the Will 
always places us in that of realities […]"
184
, (HUME, 1854, p.165).  
                                                          
182
 Cause gives rise to necessity by two related ways: 'constant union' of one object to another and 
‘inference’ from the mind in observing them.   
183
 Hume does not develop well the kinds of arguments in defense of liberty, presenting only two types.  
184
 It is certainly not so radically that Hume provides the fork between reason and actions. In what follow 
of this section, he moderates this opposition in admitting that reason takes part on calculation (judgment) 
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   The well know statement that reason always obeys passions is so important as 
their useful definition: "A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification 
of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any 
other existence of modification. […]", (HUME, 1854, p.167). To retain Hume's 
definitions is a large step to comprehend his philosophy. To understand how reason 
should be exempt of any action or motive, an epistemic clause could be of great use. 
Ideas (which are representations of objects) are the basics reasons behind objects. 
Passions, in another view, are unique in the sense that they do not refer to any object in 
the world, having therefore an original existence. In other words, they do not connect to 
any quality from the external world, what turns them singular
185
.  
Despite of the issues discussed above, there is not a claimed opposition between 
passions and reason. A fact which reinforces this view is that Hume was not a dualist. 
However, he also states that passions almost always follow reason. The only way to 
oppose reason to passions would be if they were followed by a judgement. Indeed, 
sometimes men take a passion for a reason. In this case, they tend to establish that a soft 




   Berkeley is historically considered an author who did not develop an ethical 
theory. However, this issue was approached by Olscamp (1970)
186
. This concept seems 
to arise due to certain historiographic tradition which had not underlined any moral 
commitment on Berkeley's works.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
of actions from the perceptions of pleasure and pain. However, this is an indirect relation linked by the 
idea of cause and effect. In so doing, reason is still limited and couldn’t cause actions or even volitions.    
185
 We must compare this definition with those made by Descartes. The passions, for Descartes, are 
perceptions of mind (âme) caused by the movements of spirits (esprits) (Art. 27, Les Passions De 
L’Âme). There is a whole descriptive theory of kinds of movements determined by kinds of 
apprehensions of external objects in the world. The mind could also be responsible for produce passions 
by itself (thinking on the distinction between sensible and reasonable emotions).  
186
 OLSCAMPAM (1970). This author argues exceedingly that Berkeley had, in fact, a systematic 
approach to ethics: "[…] Together, these facts imply not only that he had a moral philosophy, but that it 
may, without exaggeration, be called a system of moral philosophy." (p. 232).  
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I would like to briefly point out three traits that would put some light on this 
issue, despite been aware of the historical difficulties implicit in such endeavor. The 
first one concerns the fact that Berkeley had written during his youth an Opuscule 
entitled Passive Obedience (1712). Second one, B. Mandeville was a pungent 
interlocutor of the dialogue Alciphron (1732). His thought was chosen, in this dialogue, 
to discuss anthropological (man's place in nature) and moral (pleasure and pain) matters. 
Finally, Berkeley’s work entitled The Querist (1735-37) argues that the effort is the 
most important treasure of men. These three works show us that moral issues were 
considered in each of them, in spite the fact that ethical arguments were not their main 
target.   
Little attention was given to the fact that Berkeley had developed arguments on 
happiness
187
, liberty and free will
188
. As will be claimed, determinism must be rejected, 
accordingly to Berkeley, since free Will is what must precede the requirements for 
moral responsibility.  
   The major work to understand Berkeley’s arguments on Will is his dialogue 
Alciphron (1732). There, he criticizes determinism guiding his arguments with a 
negative approach
189
. Let’s look over this Dialogue to summarize arguments in defense 
of the freedom of Will. The major challenge would be how to conciliate the agent’s 
freedom of choice (related to Will and actions) with the principle about God’s 
foreknowledge (the thesis that He foresees and know all human actions).    
In the discussion about the truth of Christianism, Will is argued against 
determinism. Alciphron begins the section sixteenth of chapter seven refusing religious 
faith and mysteries. In his rejection of religion, he also rejects human freedom and most 
                                                          
187
 Berkeley eudaemonistic ethics is close to some of the utilitarian solutions (he claimed, as a moral 
principle, to act under the commitment to assure happiness for all human beings doesn't matter where or 
when). Even having God as the main term of his premises (accordingly to his Ontology and 
Epistemology) and eternal life been the truly end of happiness (as a moral end desired by God), Berkeley 
somehow could be said an eudaimonistic. However, he’s still far from traditional utilitarians in 
underlining the consequences as the effect of Will or its importance to moral judgments upon actions 
(see. Olscamp, 1970, p.87-91).    
188
 Will is an active mental power responsible for agent actions. However, it should not be bemused with 
ideas that are, by their turn, all passives. The major work to understand his arguments on the Will is the 
Philosophical Commentaries. In this work, Berkeley also states the two major principles of his ethics, 
saying, God and free Will.  
189
 Alciphron VII, sections 16 to 20.  
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of the Christian passions, since he understands that religion implies the idea of human 
freedom: “[...] There is therefore no foundation for praise or blame, fear or hope, reward 
or punishment ; nor consequently for religion, which, as I observerd before, is built 
upon and supposeth those things.”, (BERKELEY, 1898, p. 459).   
Alciphron, henceforth, represents determinism since he explains actions that are 
supposedly derived from free Will in such mechanical terms that Hobbes would plain 
agree. By considering men as a sort of puppets
190
, Alciphron, then, gives Euphranor a 
chance to argue against determinism.   
In such context, the first point concerns the materiality of the soul. Thereafter, if 
soul and movement are two distinct things (by ontological constitutive differences, it 
should be said), actions are not necessary because there is not a parity (as such thing as 
‘particles’) that could hold influence on each other. The issue here is clearly if actions 
are necessary or not, since from determinist terms we always must did what we’ve 
done.  
   Insisting on this subject, even accepting incorporeality of soul determinism 
would still be proved. Comprehending free will by the indifference model
191
 enables us 
to show that Will is always influenced by something other than itself (there is never 
such a state when the both sides of an action are plentifully indifferent). In the case, 
Will follows judgment in all its operations.   
This thesis does not need to be compatible with any materialistic claim about the 
soul. By offering a fine description about how men operate before actions, including the 
ways understanding and judgment works, Will figures in this system merely as an 
operative faculty that ‘obeys’ inferences made by others. For Alciphron, henceforth, 
Will is just like other faculties of mind (such as understanding and reason) due to the 
fact it is impossible for them to alter ideas coming from the external world by senses.      
   The Dialogue runs through the third point on why the Will is never free. The 
foreknowledge of God is the strongest reason generating the impossibility of freedom. 
Euphanor advances five points against this argument, which the two most important 
                                                          
190
 On the scope of modern ethics, it would be useful to compare this chapter with Leviathan’s 
Introduction and with article 12, from Descartes’ treatise, Les Passions de L’Âme.  
191
 Where indifference is identified as power ‘to act or not to act’.   
  Polymatheia 








could be summarized by the statement that men must be free to incur in mistake and 
that God could create, without contradiction, such a free creature.   
Otherwise, for Alciphron, God’s foreknowledge necessarily implies determinism 
of actions. He represents Berkeley’s voice in distinguishing between necessity and 
certainty
192
. In addition to this, what can we state about the consequences implied by the 
omnipotence of God? We may include the possibility of God to contradict himself and 
then cause a contradiction.   
   Finally, we are handled to the reply which underlines the superiority of 
judgment over Will. Judgment and Will are not really distinguished in ordinary actions. 
By the inertia of external objects, we must infer action’s determinations from within, 
what constitutes the second reason to argue in favor of freedom. Reason also is 
determinant to agent responsibility. The very consciousness of our own actions is a trait 
leading to freedom, even if free will would not be a material faculty which could be 
experienced by senses.   
Liberty is defined by Euphranor in terms of Will: “In my opinion, a man is said 
to be free so far forth as he can do what he Will. […]”, (BERKELEY, 1898, p. 465). In 
this context, Alciphron appeals to a second level argument, leading this definition to 
ordinary minds and stating that true philosophers must inquiry whether men are ‘free to 
Will’.   
** 
   Both thinkers were committed to definitions. Hume, however, made of this 
method a round-the-clock component of his thought, what seems not be the case in 
Berkeley. Berkeley achieves this point only after an extensive discussion upon the 
subject, whereas Hume departs from it.  
About Will, Hume defined it softly as an impression (not being, so, a fixed 
faculty) that could impel body and mind through different principles. The idea of 
causation is always related to necessity and chance always brings together liberty.   
                                                          
192
 This distinction was underlined by Schlick. It’s shed Berkeley into the lines of the history of ethics.  
See., Olscamp (1970, p.95).  
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For Berkeley, the Will is always reported to freedom. As we saw, it must be like 
that since actions and faults must both have a cause.                          
The first difference between them opposes a deterministic explanation of actions 
to a voluntarist who understands Will as the true motivator of actions. By opposing 
them, we could achieve other levels, including epistemic ones (on the possibility of 
knowledge of essences, for example). Concerning identity and self-conscious is 
remarkable that, for Hume, cognitive limits entails the lack of liberty; whereas for 
Berkeley men are full consciousness of their actions and this is a sign of liberty.           
   Hume is deeply far away from Berkeley by his naturalistic theory. Firstly, in 
making passions the explanans of actions he was searching for their psychological 
motivations. The existence of patterns in actions, what is due to the correspondence 
between natural laws, body and mind behavior, constitutes one strong reason for the 
nonexistence of liberty in actions. Then, we can say that Hume is determinist since he is 
a naturalist.     
Despite having written a treatise, Hume did not let aside some dialectical 
sympathies, as we can draw from his argumentation on liberty. The argument of the 
illusion of liberty based on the conception of personal identity is completed by two 
appreciations on liberty: liberty from spontaneity and indifference. Hume used here 
what I named in Berkeley section on Will a second level argument.   
Accord to Alciphron, liberty based on indifference is used to refute liberty itself, 
since there is never such a state which is undetermined. If Euphanor is next to Berkeley, 
we can claim that Alciphron, in distinct moments, argues similarly to Hume. We had 
illusions about Will’s determination on actions since we misunderstand how Will really 
works (by other words, what really determines Will). This is very curious since Hume’s 
naturalism leads him farther in terms of depth in explanation than Berkeley’s idealism.   
   Determinism came in both theories by different needs (a naturalistic 
explanation about actions and a religious attachment to God’s foreknowledge). Can we 
interpret Berkeley’s arguments in favor of free-will adapted to what Hume argues about 
the utility of religion, in other words, religious necessity to make believe in liberty? 
Christianism requires liberty for ethical support, but there is no apologetically evidence 
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in Berkeley’s Dialogue, even if his point of depart is very similar to Christian 
arguments. There is no commitment, in Hume, to prove the existence of the soul.  
   In conclusion, we must pay close attention to the fact that Hume’s determinism 
is not classifiable as a radical one
193
. A gap in the inferences of mind related to external 
objects could justify chance, since the mind is not a perfect mirror of natural laws 
entailed by physical determinism. This does not mean in any way that Will does not 
have any connection with actions, it may as well be the contrary. Finally, in this point 
both neighbors would agree in a certain way, even if for Berkeley Will is related to 
actions by an epistemic confusion that entangles judgment on Will.   
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